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Promoting Arab Collective Claims in the Judicial Arena 
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One of the central debates on the Israeli political scene in 2005 was the public 
controversy between the President of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, and the 
Minister of Justice, Tzipi Livni, on the nomination of three new justices to the 
Supreme Court. This controversy focused on Law professor Ruth Gavison, 
whose nomination Barak opposed because of her vehement criticism of the 
political orientation and judicial activism of the Supreme Court, which many 
observers attribute to Barak himself. The extent of this controversy indicated the 
political significance of the composition of the Supreme Court and political 
importance of the direction of its judicial policy after the retirement of its present 
President in September 2005. 
The Supreme Court has become a central actor on the Israeli political and 
public scene. It is considered pivotal actor in the judicialization of Israeli politics 
and society and has, despite numerous criticisms, gained a public reputation as 
ultimate defender of the country’s democracy. It systematically involves itself in 
areas that were traditional domains of other public authorities, and has thus 
restrained or substituted their influence on crucial social and political issues. Its 
reputation as last defense of democracy reposes on its active role in the 
enforcement of the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms in public 
policies. It has been encouraged in this by law professionals and civil society 
actors, who entered the judicial arena to promote sectarian interests of 
individuals and marginalized groups.  
The systematization of the political use of Law and Justice is indicative of an 
increased perception of Law as a means for collective action and of Justice as a 
privileged arena for political expression and participation. The law is 
strategically mobilized by social actors and law professionals to force the 
acknowledgement of specific social and political claims in public policies. The 
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study of these practices in the Israeli context contributes to the theory on the use 
of legal means in collective action, and more generally, on the role of Justice in 
democratic societies that are undergoing profound societal changes. The judicial 
activism by Israel’s Arab minority is in this context a particularly privileged 
fieldwork. With its singular history and status, the minority demands social and 
political rights that relate to fundamental questions of State, and requests that the 
judicial power arbitrate between the minority and the State. This analysis will 
focus on claims arising from the allocation of public resources such as land, 
which constitutes a large part of legal challenges. 
 
The judicial activism by the Arab minority reflects strategies that were 
developed in and should therefore be understood in the wider context of the 
judicialization of Israeli politics and society and its particular political meaning 
with regard to the marginalization of the Arab minority in the public and 
political spheres. Despite the inherent limitations to the strategy of such judicial 
activism, it is used by numerous actors who aim to significantly influence public 
policy.  
 
 
I. The Judicialization of Politics and Society in Israel 
The judicialization of Israeli politics and society in the nineties was concomitant 
with the expansion of judicial power based on the North American model onto 
the international level.1 The conditions and modalities of the entry of this form 
of judicial power into the Israeli context display similarities with those observed 
in other countries. Socio-political transformations, such as the shift in the 
balance of powers and the consequent increase in the political power of the 
Supreme Court, as well as the active involvement of political, judicial and social 
actors, were determinant factors in the judicialization of Israeli politics and 
society.   
 
Judicialization of politics 
The concept of the judicialization of politics has become an influential 
instrument in the analysis of the mechanisms behind the “expansion of the 
province of the courts or the judges at the expense of the politicians and/or the 
administrators, that is, the transfer of decision-making rights from the 
                                                
1 C. Neal Tate & T. Vallinder, The Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The 
Judicialization of Politics, New York, New York University Press, 1995. 
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legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts.”2 This expansion relies 
on the increase in the number of these mechanisms which result in a larger 
influence of Justice on public policies. One such example is the increase in the 
number of recourses to judicial arbitration, increasing numbers of appeals made 
to the courts on social key-issues, and the shifting of political affairs’ settlement 
from the political to the judicial arena.3 Among other, this phenomenon has 
resulted in a greater role for judges in norm-setting, to the detriment of the 
legislative power.4 As such, it is frequently denounced as a blow to majority 
democracy or praised as the expression of the rule of law.  
According to Jacques Commaille,5 the explanation for this development can 
be found in the following socio-political evolutions: the increasing influence of 
the media and the market, in the advent of democratic individualism, in the 
shifting role of the State, in the contractualization of social relationships, in the 
crisis of politics and politics’ inability to find solutions to sensitive social issues, 
and in the end of great ideologies. Neal Tate6 identifies the conditions that 
encourage the expansion of judicial power as the separation of powers, the 
“politics of rights” – understood as “an acceptance of the principle that 
individuals or minorities have rights that can be enforced against the will of 
putative majorities” –, the use of legal courts by special interest groups and the 
opposition, ineffective majority institutions and negative perceptions of policy-
making institutions, refusal by majority institutions to deal with particular issues, 
and judges with the appropriate personal attitudes and policy preferences or 
values. 
 
Loss of Power of Majority Institutions 
The loss of power of the legislative and executive authorities and their 
delegitimization in the eyes of the public, are considered to be central factors in 
the judicialization of Israeli society and politics. Martin Edelman7 explains that 
« rampant partisanship, arbitrary and self-interested policies, and, worst of all, an 
                                                
2 T. Vallinder “When the Courts Go Marching In” in C. Neal Tate and T. Vallinder, 
op. cit.  
3 Jacques Commaille, « La judiciarisation. Une nouvelle économie de la légalité face au 
social et au politique », work paper, CERAT, February 2002 (French). 
4 Violaine Roussel, « La judiciarisation du politique : réalités et faux semblants », 
Mouvements, 29, september-october 2003 (French). 
5 Jacques Commaille, op. cit. 
6 C. Neal Tate, “Why the expansion of judicial power?,” in C. Neal Tate and T. Vallinder, 
op.cit. 
7 Martin Edelman, “Israel”, in C. Neal Tate and T. Vallinder, op.cit. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Judicialization of Politics  
 
 290 
inability to deal with crucial problems besetting Israeli society, corroded that 
authority and, ultimately, the power of the elected leadership ». According to 
Gad Barzilai,8 the traditional balance of powers between a strong legislative 
power and a centralized executive was first weakened by the legislative elections 
of 1977. Marking on one hand the end of the political monopoly by the Mapai 
party and Laborites, these elections highlighted the division in political 
leadership in the Knesset and on the other hand, the beginning of the growth of 
the influence of small political parties that, due to the fragmented nature of 
coalition politics in Israel, could negotiate their support against funding for their 
particular constituents. This trend intensified after 1992 with the introduction of 
a new electoral system with direct election for Prime Minister. These changes 
offered the Supreme Court the opportunity to increase its political role by 
stepping into the void left by representative institutions in the settlement of main 
social and political questions. 
The transition from “party hegemony to the judicial hegemony”9 paralleled 
the americanization of Israeli society during the seventies. In the opinion of 
Itzhak Galnoor10 the artificial introduction of American institutional organs and 
of its interpretation of balance of power, which favors the power of the judiciary, 
signified a dangerous erosion of the Israeli tradition of strong 
parliamentarianism. This americanization was accompanied by the development 
of “the ethos of a litigious society”11 and by the identification of a growing 
section of Israeli society with democratic, secular and liberal values, values 
which the Supreme Court represents. According to Ran Hirschl,12 the threat to 
these values posed by the increasing influence of small political parties, in 
particular religious ones, led to the introduction of the Basic Laws of 1992. The 
political, economic and judicial elites that identified themselves with these 
values had effectively transferred part of their decision-making power and the 
defense of these values to the Supreme Court.  
 
                                                
8 Gad Barzilai, “Partisan leadership and electoral laws: the Israeli domain in context,” 
Palestine, Jordan, Israel-PASSIA, first edition, December 1997. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Itzhak Galnoor, “The judicialization of the public sphere in Israel,” Israel Law Review, 
37, Summer-Fall 2003.  
11 Menachem Mautner, “Law and Culture in Israel: The 1950s and the 1980s,” in 
R. Harris, A. Kedar, P. Lahav, A. Likhovski (eds), The History of Law in a Multi-
Cultural Society: Israel 1917-1967, Aldershot, 2002.  
12 Ran Hirschl, “Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism,” Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2004.  
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The Supreme Court
13
 and “the Politics of Rights” 
The introduction of two Basic Laws in 1992,14 last “chapters” in Israel’s 
progressive and uncompleted written constitution, led to the constitutionalization 
of the Israeli legal system, introducing a « constitutional revolution » according 
to Aharon Barak.15 They were the first to define the formal legal status of several 
fundamental rights16 and to hold a normative value superior to ordinary laws. 
They were amended in 1994 to include a reference to the principles contained in 
Israel’s Declaration of Independence17 and to “the values of Israel as a Jewish 
and democratic state” which placed the Supreme Court in front of values often 
deemed irreconcilable.18 The Supreme Court asserted the constitutional nature of 
the Basic Laws in a landmark case in 1995,19 thus opening all existing laws to 
judicial review in the light of their constitutionality with regard to the 
fundamental rights contained in the Basic Laws.  
Although this “constitutional revolution” encouraged the Supreme Court’s 
activism, it was, in fact, only the formalization of fundamental rights and of the 
doctrine of judicial intervention that had already been established through 
jurisprudence.20 In the framework of its judicial review of administrative acts, 
the Court extended the scope of review to all statutory provisions, and even to 
some legislative acts, in the name of the doctrine of justiciability of political 
acts. The democratic character of the state served as justification for the liberal 
and extensive interpretation of the principles which orientate public action. The 
legal principles contained in the Supreme Court’s “ theory of rights and 
                                                
13 On the functions and the role of the Israeli Supreme Court, see Claude Klein, « Le 
Droit israélien », PUF, collection Que sais-je ?, 1986 and « La Cour Suprême : un îlot 
dans la tourmente », Les Cahiers de l’Orient, 70, 2ème trimestre 2003 (French).  
14 The Basic Law on Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law on Human Dignity and 
Freedom.   
15 Aharon Barak, « La révolution constitutionnelle : la protection des droits 
fondamentaux », Pouvoirs, 72, 1995 (French). 
16 These fundamental rights encompass the freedom of occupation; protection of the life, 
body and dignity of human being; protection from arrest, detention or extradition; 
protection of the residence and of the secret of correspondence.  
17 The Declaration of Independence entrenches the principles of freedom, peace and 
justice; a complete equality in social and political rights to all citizens, without distinction 
based on belief, race or gender; as well as freedom of belief, religion, education and 
culture.   
18 Dan Avnon, “The Israeli Basic Laws (Potentially) Fatal Flaw,” Israel Law Review, 
32 (4), 1998. 
19 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village (1995), 49 (iv) P.D. 221. 
20 Aharon Barak, Judicial discretion, Yale University Press, Yale, 1989. 
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freedoms”21 are the freedom of expression and of equality, the right to individual 
freedom and security, the freedom of movement, religion and conscience, the 
right to strike, association and gathering, the right to follow one’s vocation and 
the right to private property. If the development of this jurisprudential law 
greatly relies on the personality and activism of judges like Meir Shamgar or 
Aharon Barak, it is also dependent on the activism of social actors and cause 
lawyers that took the opportunity to develop and extend their judicial activities 
following the implementation of public standing22 in 1986.   
 
Civil society and cause lawyers 
Israeli civil society saw unprecedented growth in the eighties, with the 
appearance of many non-governmental organizations representing different 
sectarian interests. Some of these organizations specialized in or oriented a part 
of their action to the defense of legal rights. such as the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel, ACRI. They were inspired by the US civil rights movement of 
the sixties and seventies, whose success to a great extent relied on the use of 
legal skills, opportunities and tools. The introduction of legal strategies proven 
in the American and international context to Israel was supported by American 
institutions and foundations.23 These encouraged the use of the American human 
rights model and the liberal approach abroad through, for instance, awarding 
stipends to foreign law professionals at American universities, Fullbright 
scholarships for the creation of legal aid clinics and directed  funding of NGO 
projects.    
A new category of actors linked to the social movements appeared: cause 
lawyers who applied their legal skills to the defense of the rights of minorities 
and disempowered groups. The term “cause lawyering,” defined by Austin Sarat 
and Stuart Scheingold,24 is both an analytical category and a definition25 used to 
                                                
21 Françoise Dreyfus, « La Cour Suprême : l’audace du juge », Pouvoirs, 72, 1995 
(French). 
22 In Ressler v. Defense Minister (H.C. 910/86), the Court acknowledged the right to any 
person, even if not personally affected by the government action, to attack that action in 
court if the action raises an important question of wide public implications. 
23 This phenomenon has been studied in the South-American context by Yves Dezalay 
and Bryant G. Garth, The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and 
the Contest to Transform Latin American States, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
2002.  
24 Austin Sarat et Stuart Scheingold (eds.), Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and 
Professional Responsabilities, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998; idem, Cause 
Lawyering and the State in a Global Era, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
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describe law professionals, innovating legal strategies and activities that are 
oriented towards the defense of a social or political cause. Since the eighties, 
Israeli cause lawyers developed an agenda of socio-political laws grounded on 
the principles of human rights and social justice.26 Some cause lawyers, 
especially those of  ACRI or those of big law firms, progressively entered what 
Patricia Woods calls “the judicial community.”27 This diffuse and elite 
community of cause lawyers, law professors and justices of the Supreme Court 
is motivated by the belief in the rule of law and can be considered as a space that 
defines new norms. Through the normative debates within this community, 
justices of the Supreme Court indicate to cause lawyers the arguments and 
judicial cases that they are amenable to receive. By using this knowledge, cause 
lawyers enable the Court to translate some of these norms into legal principles, 
thus increasing the Court’s political influence.  
 
 
II. Judicial Activism for the Arab Minority in Israel 
The legal defense for Israel’s Arab minority knew important developments 
during the nineties. The number of actors multiplied and the Supreme Court 
became more receptive to their claims. New innovative legal strategies were 
developed to translate the minority’s social and political claims into legal rights’ 
claims, while at the same time grounding them notably on the principle of 
equality developed in constitutional jurisprudence. Despite numerous legal 
victories, it is debated by the actors involved and within the empirical research 
community, to what degree these victories have resulted in a improving the 
political and social status of the minority. The pronounced liberalism of the 
Supreme Court and its hesitation to statute on issues that constitute major 
political challenges to the state are considered serious limitations to this process.     
 
The social and political marginalization of the Arab minority in Israel 
The members of the Arab community in Israel are descendants of 
Palestinians who remained inside the borders of the newly created State of Israel 
on May 14, 1948. Citizens of Israel, this national, cultural and religious minority 
                                                                                                          
25 Liora Israël, « La Justice comme espace politique. Trois études de cas : Israël, Inde, 
Argentine », Droit et Société, 55, 2004 (French). 
26 Neta Ziv, “Hanging by the Cloak – Advocates for Social Change in Israel: Between the 
Legal and the Political,” Adalah’s newsletter, 2, June 2004. 
27 Patricia Woods, « Normes juridiques et changement politique en Israël », Droit et 
Société, 55, 2004 (French). 
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counts more than one million today.28 Their origin and history position them 
outside Jewish and Zionist meta-narratives on which the new state was built. 
State law, which gave preference to distinctions between different religious and 
national belongings, has not granted the Arab population the status of a minority, 
and consequently does not recognize rights attached to that status.29 Although 
members of the minority have had full civil and political rights since the end of 
the military administration in 1966, the minority is faced with severe social and 
political discrimination. This is in part due to the constitutional status of Israel as 
a “Jewish State.”30 Moreover, the confiscation in the first years of the State of its 
main resources, in particular that of land, and public policies which give 
preference to the interests of the Jewish majority31 contributed to the social and 
economic marginalization of the Arab minority. Their identity was constructed, 
noted Gad Barzilai32, on a feeling of collective deprivation, of a lack of freedom 
of expression and of discrimination in policies related to social rights and land.  
For a long time, this socio-economic marginalization was translated on the 
political level by a quasi absence of representative institutions capable of 
representing and defending the interests of the Arab minority.33 Increased 
communalization and palestinization34 during the eighties however, was 
reflected by the creation of several Arab political parties. These parties 
succeeded in attracting a majority of the Arab vote, which translated into 
genuine negotiating power in the political game. However, internal 
fragmentation, lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Israeli public and the refusal 
by the main Jewish political parties to integrate the Arab parties into 
governmental coalitions prevented these of increasing their influence on public 
policy-making. Failure by the Arab political leadership combined with a acuter 
feeling of collective deprivation, resulted in several developments that weakened 
these strategies: The violent demonstrations in October 2000, the massive 
boycott of the 2001 national elections and the growing support for the Islamic 
                                                
28 The Arab minority constitutes as such 20% of the whole Israeli population.  
29 The Arab nationality is legally recognized, but distinguished from the Druze and 
Bedouin nationalities that characterize groups considered as integrant parts of the 
minority. 
30 David Kretzmer, « Les droits de l’homme en Israël », Pouvoirs, 72, 1995 (French). 
31 Gad Barzilai, “Fantaisies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence: State Law, Politics 
and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community,” Israel Law Review, 34 (3), 2003. 
32 Idem. 
33 Laurence Louër, « Comment gérer la minorité arabe d’Israël ? Les élections de mai 
1999 », Politique étrangère, 65 (2), 2000 (French).  
34 Ibid. 
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Movement.35 It also pushed the new Arab elite into seeking alternative strategies 
of expression and promotion of their social and political claims, in the 
associative movement and in organizations of legal defense.    
 
Lawyers of the Arab cause 
Until the nineties, the legal defense of the Arab minority interests remained 
relatively limited. Cause lawyers at ACRI, which was then the only organization 
providing professional and organizational support to the defense of a wide range 
of civil rights, were the first to invest in the Arab minority. The Qa’adan affair, 
initiated in 1995 by ACRI, was the first landmark judicial case addressing the 
right to equality of the Arab citizens in the access to public resources. ACRI and 
the Program for Legal Education of the New Israel Fund, NIF, born in 1984,36 
were essential in the emergence of a new generation of Arab lawyers who 
developed a legal approach to articulating national discourse and collective 
rights. Hassan Jabareen, who was educated in the United States and was the first 
Arab recipient of the NIF program in 1990, created Adalah, The Association for 
the Defense of the Arab Minority in Israel, in 1996 on the model of ACRI where 
he had previously worked. Adalah is now the biggest association for the defense 
of the rights of the Arab minority, with eight lawyers working on prisoners’ 
rights, land rights, social, economic and cultural rights, including religious and 
language rights, women rights, and rights in the Occupied Territories. The 
lawyers at Adalah formed a strategy from their judicial activism for the 
promotion of collective rights of the Arab minority on the political level. In spite 
of the strong political implication of its petitions, the professionalism of its 
lawyers and its public relations’ employees resulted in Adalah’s success and 
reputation before the Supreme Court and the Israeli public eye. Adalah is 
however criticized within the community for defending only cases that pursue a 
collective interest and for its refusal to defend individuals against Arab 
communal institutions, in particular against religious institutions.       
The growing receptivity of the Supreme Court to Adalah’s petitions 
encouraged the entry of other organizations to this field and influenced the 
strategies of those that, like ACRI, were already working in it. ACRI 
progressively renounced the Jewish and Zionist perspective that characterized its 
initial approach to cases related to the Arab minority and adopted an approach 
                                                
35 Laurence Louër, « L’Intifada d’Al-Aqsa : quelle place pour les citoyens arabes de 
l’État juif ? », Cultures et Conflits, 41, 2001 (French).  
36 The New Israel Fund Program, funded by the Ford Foundation, combines one year of 
legal education in an American university and one year of practice within a human rights 
organization. 
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close to Adalah’s.37 It also got involved further with the launching of its program 
“Equality for Arab Citizens” in 2000. The Legal Aid Clinic of Tel-Aviv 
University, created in 1983, also got involved more systematically in the defense 
of the rights of the Arab minority, notably under the direction of Neta Ziv, a 
former ACRI lawyer. Beyond the defense of socio-economic and housing rights, 
the Clinic distinguished itself through the defense of Arab citizens against their 
community-based institutions, such as the defense of women rights against 
religious courts. These organizations and their cause lawyers work closely with 
the associations of Arab civil society whose social and political claims they 
relay. This informal coordination constitutes a guarantee for the legitimacy of 
their actions in the eyes of the minority. The concern for legitimacy moreover 
encourages predominantly Jewish organizations to entrust Arab lawyers with 
cases related to the minority. The trend in the last few years is towards greater 
cooperation between these organizations and they have begun to work together 
on several petitions to the Supreme Court and in judicial actions. These 
exchanges also resulted in some cause lawyers to move from an organization to 
another.   
 
Which cause(s), which right(s)? 
During the initial years of judicial activism in defense of the Arab minority, 
two approaches characterized the methods and strategies used by Adalah and 
ACRI in the selection and building of judicial cases. These approaches were 
opposed in the Qa’adan family case.38 The Qa’adan family was legally 
represented by ACRI. The family had been denied the right to live in Qatzir, a 
village built by the Jewish Agency on public land, on the basis of their ethnic 
origin. ACRI attacked the State for discriminating in the allocation of public 
resources through a third party, founding its argument on the Right to Equality. 
Adalah criticized ACRI for having deliberately limited the petition to the 
Qa’adans’ case and having therefore avoided the greater issue of state policies 
on land confiscation and management. Adalah objects to the individual and 
formal interpretation of the right to equality defended by ACRI in this case, and 
favors a substantive interpretation that takes into account past discriminations 
and genuine needs of the Arab minority.39 Answering these needs requires, 
                                                
37 Neta Ziv, interview, August 28 2005. 
38 H.C. 6698/95, Qa’adan v. Administration of Israel Lands et al. 
39 For a detailed analysis of the formal and substantive conceptions of equality, see 
Youssef Jabareen, Constitutional protection of minorities in comparative perspective: 
Palestinians in Israel and African-Americans in the United States, Ph-D thesis, 
Georgetown University Law Center, 2003. 
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according to Adalah, an equal allocation of development budgets to the Arab 
local authorities and institutions, in which a majority of the Arab population live. 
As such, Adalah oriented part of its action against discriminations in the 
allocation of governmental budgets, in the areas of religion, education, health or 
local authorities’ development.40 The petition brought by Adalah in 1998 against 
the National Priority Areas41 is indicative of this strategy. Adalah attacked a 
governmental decision granting substantial social and economic benefits, 
notably in the field of education, to residential communities categorized as 
National Priority Areas, from which the majority of the Arab towns and villages 
were excluded in spite of their severe socio-economic conditions. The Supreme 
Court accepted in February 2006 the argument according to which the decision 
lacks proper grounding and is discriminatory in its effect, thus asking the 
government to cancel it. The Court reasserted the obligation made to the State to 
ensure equality for Arab citizens in the allocation of public resources. Adalah’s 
strategy has further aimed for the recognition of Arab collective rights and of 
Arab narrative in public policies. This strategy gradually found an echo in the 
Supreme Court,42 which notably acknowledged the cultural specificity of the 
Arab minority and the official status of the Arabic language by calling on the 
state and on mixed-cities to add Arabic to public road signs.43 
The growing receptivity of the Supreme Court to Adalah’s petitions 
encouraged other legal aid organizations to present similar cases, developing 
similar strategies and arguments. For instance, in the rally against the use of 
indirect discrimination through selection criteria, such as the requirement for 
completed military service,44 in the allocation of financial aids to families and 
for education and housing the three organizations collaborated45. Due to the 
                                                
40 H.C. 240/98, Adalah, et al. v. Minister of Religious Affairs, et al. , P.D. 52 (2) 167 ; 
and H.C. 1113/99, Adalah, et al.  v. Minister of Religious Affairs, et al., P.D. 54 (2) 
164 ; H.C. 6671/03, Munjid Abu Ghanem, et al.  v. Ministry of Education, et. Al ; H.C. 
786/04, Ahlam el-Sana, et al. v. Ministry of Health, et al.; C. 6223/01, National 
Committee of Arab Mayors, et al. v. Ministry of the Interior, et al.  
41 H.C. 2773/98 and H.C. 11163/03, The High Follow-Up Committee for the Arab 
Citizens of Israel, et al. v. The Prime Ministre of Israel. 
42 Neta Ziv, “Law, Constitutionnalism and Mobilizing for Social Change: the case of the 
Palestinians in Israel,” paper introduced to the Conference on Constitutionalism, MADA 
al-Carmel, Nazareth, June 2004.   
43 H.C. 4438/97, Adalah, et al.   v. The Ministry of Transportation, et al. , Takdim Elyon, 
1998 (1) 11 et H.C. 4112/99, Adalah, et al.  v. The Municipalities of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, et al.  
44 A majority of the Arab population does not participate in the military, since 
conscription is not compulsory for her.    
45 H.C. 4822/02, The National Committee of Arab Mayors and Adalah v. Avraham Burg, 
et al.; H.C. 2814/97, Follow-Up Committee on Arab Education et al. v. Minister of 
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Arab population’s acute need for improvement in education, these organizations 
attempt to encourage the Supreme Court to recognize the right to education as a 
basic right and to instruct the state to implement affirmative action. With regard 
to access to land and housing, in which the divergence between the Arab and 
state narratives is greatest, many petitions have been presented. In a case similar 
to the Qa’adan affair, the three organizations challenged not only the particular 
governmental decision but also attacked a foundation stone of the state’s land 
policies, which is the delegation of the management of state lands46 to Jewish 
para-public institutions.47 ACRI distinguished itself in this field by introducing a 
petition for fair representation of the Arab population in these institutions.48 The 
status of Bedouin villages that have remained unrecognized by the state since 
1966, the time of the National Master Plan, gave rise to innovative legal 
strategies developed by cause lawyers. In order to force the State to recognize 
these villages, they obligate it to develop public infrastructures49 there in the 
name of the basic right of their inhabitants to live in a dignified way.       
 
The limitations to judicial activism 
The example of unrecognized Bedouin villages illustrates the limitations of 
judicial activism and the strategies of skirting elaborated by cause lawyers. 
Indeed, in spite of its greater receptivity to the claims by the Arab minority in 
the last few years, the Supreme Court still refuses to rule on cases that would 
have significant political implications and open itself up to requests for 
important legal and material remedies. Furthermore, the Court rejects all 
petitions that contest past and general policies. One such example is the national 
planning policy that aims to gather the Bedouin population into townships by re-
classifying the lands where they live as agricultural lands that cannot be 
developed. Cause lawyers have therefore aimed to circumvent these limitations 
by limiting their petitions to specific demands, such as requesting the allocation 
of public resources and infrastructures that are considered by the Court as part of 
the basic rights that the state must guarantee to every citizen. These requests 
                                                                                                          
Education et al., P.D. 54 (3) 233 ; H.C. 9289/03, Adalah, et al. v. Israel Lands 
Administration, et al.  
46 93% of the Israeli lands are State land.  
47 H.C. 9205/04, Adalah v. The Israel Lands Administration, et al.  
48 The Association for Civil Rights in Israel v. Israel Land Authority (2001) 55 P.D. V 15. 
49 H.C. 5221/00, Dahlala Abu Ghardud, et al. v. Ramat HaNegev Regional Council, 
et al.; H.C. 7115/97, Adalah, et al. v. Ministry of Health, et al.; H.C. 3586/01, The 
Regional Council for Unrecognized Villages in the Naqab, et al. v. The Minister of 
National Infrastructure, et al.  
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however do not request radical remedies to the wider problem and are often 
solved through out-of-court settlements between the State and the petitioners. 
This is also the case for petitions related to the allocation of governmental 
budgets and specific aids, to which the Court has asked the petitioners to limit 
their requests to precise budget lines. When Adalah contested the repartition of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs’ budgets in 1998,50 its petition was deemed too 
general by the Court. Attacking discriminatory actions by the state is also made 
difficult due to the fact that the burden of proof lies with the petitioners who can 
seldom gain access to the necessary information. Another important limit to 
legal defense is the constant refusal by the Supreme Court to intervene in 
conflicts in which the State invokes national security. Samera Esmeir51 explains 
that Adalah once refused to represent Arab inhabitants of Umm el-Fahm whose 
lands were to be expropriated by the state in order to build a field for military 
training. Aware of the low potential of victory of this case in the judicial arena, 
Adalah advised the inhabitants to use other means of political protest.                 
Cause lawyers are generally pessimistic on the effectiveness of the victories 
they have obtained before the Supreme Court. Some of the legal and material 
remedies granted by the Court are not enforced, due in part to the absence of 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the Court’s decisions. 
Despite their victory before the Court, the Qa’adans were systematically denied 
the right to live in Qatzir so that ACRI had to present a new petition before the 
Supreme Court in order to implement its first decision. Eight years passed before 
the Qa’adans had their rights enforced. Feet-dragging by the Supreme Court in 
cases related to the Arab minority has been thoroughly criticized. Generally 
cautious on these cases with strong political dimension, the Court does its utmost 
to bring the parties to a compromise so as to avoid a decision that could act as 
precedent. The Court also takes care not to fundamentally question the state. It is 
criticized for having developed an extensive rhetoric on equality without having 
granted the remedies that could guarantee the enforcement of equality.52 The 
Court remains in a formal and individual interpretation of equality and of other 
basic rights, a conception that fits the liberal orientation of its jurisprudence that 
many cause lawyers of the Arab minority consider to be inadequate to defend the 
minority in its interactions with the state.53  
                                                
50 H.C. 240/98, Adalah, et al.  v. Minister of Religious Affairs, et al. , P.D. 52 (2) 167. 
51 Samera Esmeir, “Resisting litigation in Umm el-Fahem”, Human Rights Dialogue, 2 
(2), 2000. 
52 Gad Barzilai, op. cit.; and Youssef Jabareen, op. cit.    
53 Gad Barzilai, Communities and Law. Politics and Cultures of Legal Identities, 
University of Michigan Press, 2005.  
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Conclusion. On Judicial Activism and Social Change 
The question whether courts can bring about social and political change has 
resulted in a large body of literature internationally as well as in Israel. The 
limitations of judicial activism in instigating deeper social and political changes 
have been noted by Gerald Rosenberg54 in the US and further developed by Gad 
Barzilai55 in the Israeli context.  Social activism, they hold, is a costly method of 
socio-political struggle. It relies on an elite and utilizes legalistic language and 
professional norms which make it difficult to translate some social and political 
problems into litigation. Moreover, in case of victory, the means of enforcement 
of rulings against the State authorities is weak, and finally, the use of litigation 
can lead to the de-politization of social movements, as its actors renounce to 
other means of action. Several social actors and cause lawyers who represent the 
interests of the Arab minority engage in academic research on these issues and 
are aware of these limitations. However, they are convinced that their small 
victories, accumulated over time, will result in significant changes and they will 
therefore continue to put a lot of effort in these practices. This conviction is 
corroborated by the study of McCann56 which showed that judicial activism can 
lead to significant changes by forcing changes in individual practices and in 
political norms, rules and agendas. Judicial action, and notably its media 
coverage, can bring about awareness among the targeted group and the society 
as a whole, and as such become a boosting factor for collective action.      
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University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001. 
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